Alex Warstadt

We introduce The Benchmark of Linguistic Minimal Pairs (BLiMP),1 a challenge set for evaluating the linguistic knowledge of language models (LMs) on major grammatical phenomena in English. BLiMP consists of 67 individual datasets, each containing 1,000 minimal pairs—that is, pairs of minimally different sentences that contrast in grammatical acceptability and isolate specific phenomenon in syntax, morphology, or semantics. We generate the data according to linguist-crafted grammar templates, and human aggregate agreement with the labels is 96.4%. We evaluate n-gram, LSTM, and Transformer (GPT-2 and Transformer-XL) LMs by observing whether they assign a higher probability to the acceptable sentence in each minimal pair. We find that state-of-the-art models identify morphological contrasts related to agreement reliably, but they struggle with some subtle semantic and syntactic phenomena, such as negative polarity items and extraction islands.

One reason pretraining on self-supervised linguistic tasks is effective is that it teaches models features that are helpful for language understanding. However, we want pretrained models to learn not only to represent linguistic features, but also to use those features preferentially during fine-turning. With this goal in mind, we introduce a new English-language diagnostic set called MSGS (the Mixed Signals Generalization Set), which consists of 20 ambiguous binary classification tasks that we use to test whether a pretrained model prefers linguistic or surface generalizations during finetuning. We pretrain RoBERTa from scratch on quantities of data ranging from 1M to 1B words and compare their performance on MSGS to the publicly available RoBERTa_BASE. We find that models can learn to represent linguistic features with little pretraining data, but require far more data to learn to prefer linguistic generalizations over surface ones. Eventually, with about 30B words of pretraining data, RoBERTa_BASE does consistently demonstrate a linguistic bias with some regularity. We conclude that while self-supervised pretraining is an effective way to learn helpful inductive biases, there is likely room to improve the rate at which models learn which features matter.

The influential Question Under Discussion (QUD) theory of discourse (Roberts, 2012) formal- izes Grice’s notion of relevance. In this paper, we identify a class of relevant discourse moves where Roberts’s account undergenerates, and propose a more inclusive definition of relevance. For example, if asked Should we cancel the picnic?, one can reply If it rains without fully resolving the question. However, in Roberts’s theory, all relevant responses to polar questions are predicted to fully resolve the question because a relevant answer must eliminate at least one alternative in the QUD. We propose that a non-resolving response to a polar question is relevant if it eliminates a set of worlds that overlaps with only some alternatives in the QUD. The new account turns out to make good predictions in the domain of polar questions, and beyond.

Prosody—the suprasegmental component of speech, including pitch, loudness, and tempo—carries critical aspects of meaning. However, the relationship between the information conveyed by prosody vs. by the words themselves remains poorly understood. We use large language models (LLMs) to estimate how much information is redundant between prosody and the words themselves. Using a large spoken corpus of English audiobooks, we extract prosodic features aligned to individual words and test how well they can be predicted from LLM embeddings, compared to non-contextual word embeddings. We find a high degree of redundancy between the information carried by the words and prosodic information across several prosodic features, including intensity, duration, pauses, and pitch contours. Furthermore, a word’s prosodic information is redundant with both the word itself and the context preceding as well as following it. Still, we observe that prosodic features can not be fully predicted from text, suggesting that prosody carries information above and beyond the words. Along with this paper, we release a general-purpose data processing pipeline for quantifying the relationship between linguistic information and extra-linguistic features.

The English exclusive just is not synonymous with other exclusives such as only in sentences like Sometimes, bad things just/only happen. I give a new analysis of just which explains this and other puzzling readings of just observed in earlier work (e.g. Wiegand, 2016; Beltrama, 2018). I argue that just excludes alternatives derived from a potential question, or possible future QUD, in the sense of Onea (2016). This new perspective makes it possible to give the first unified account of these non-canonical exclusive readings of just, and provides evidence that the semantics of lexical items can be sensitive to possible futures of the discourse.

Humans appear to have a critical period (CP) for language acquisition: Second language (L2) acquisition becomes harder after early childhood, and ceasing exposure to a first language (L1) after this period (but not before) typically does not lead to substantial loss of L1 proficiency. It is unknown whether these CP effects result from innately determined brain maturation or as a stabilization of neural connections naturally induced by experience. In this study, we use language models (LMs) to test the extent to which these phenomena are peculiar to humans, or shared by a broader class of language learners. We vary the age of exposure by training LMs on language pairs in various experimental conditions, and find that LMs, which lack any direct analog to innate maturational stages, do not show CP effects when the age of exposure of L2 is delayed. Our results contradict the claim that CP effects are an inevitable result of statistical learning, and they are consistent with an innate mechanism for CP effects. We show that we can reverse-engineer the CP by introducing a regularizer partway through training to simulate a maturational decrease in plasticity. All in all, our results suggest that L1 learning on its own may not be enough to induce a CP, and additional engineering is necessary to make language models more cognitively plausible.